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Despite the net economic and social benefits of reducing most government subsidies
2 and 
opening economies to trade, almost every national government intervenes in markets for goods and 
services in ways that distort international commerce. Those distortionary policies harm most the 
economies imposing them, but the worst of them (in agriculture and clothing) are particularly harmful to 
the world’s poorest people. A key challenge facing the world, and identified recently by both the 
Copenhagen Consensus Project (Lomborg 2004) and the UN’s Millennium Goals Project (Messerlin et 
al. 2004), is to rid the world of such wasteful and anti-poor policies. This challenge in its modern form 
has been with us for about 75 years. The latter part of the nineteenth century saw a strong movement 
towards laissez faire, but that development was reversed following the first world war in ways that led to 
the Great Depression of the early 1930s and the conflict that followed (Kindleberger 1989). It was 
during the second world war, in 1944, that a conference at Bretton Woods proposed an International 
Trade Organization. An ITO charter was drawn up by 1948 along with a General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), but the ITO idea died when the United States failed to progress it through Congress 
(Diebold 1952). Despite that, the GATT during its 47-year history (before it was absorbed into the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) on 1 January 1995) oversaw the gradual lowering of many tariffs on 
imports of manufactured goods by governments of developed countries. Manufacturing tariffs remained 
high in developing countries, however, and distortionary subsidies and trade policies affecting 
agricultural and services markets of both rich and poor countries continued to hamper efficient resource 
allocation, economic growth and poverty alleviation.  
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations led to agreements signed in 1994 that have 
seen some trade liberalization over the subsequent ten years. But even when those agreements were fully 
implemented by end-2004, and despite additional unilateral trade liberalizations since the 1980s by a 
number of countries (particularly developing and transition economies), many subsidies and trade 
distortions remain. They include not just trade taxes-cum-subsidies but also contingent protection 
measures such as anti-dumping, regulatory standards that can be technical barriers to trade, and domestic 
production subsidies (allegedly decoupled in the case of some farm support programs but in fact only 
partially so). Insufficient or excessive taxation or quantitative regulations in the presence of externalities 
such as pollution also lead to inefficiencies and can be trade distorting. Furthermore, the on-going 
proliferation of preferential trading and bilateral or regional integration arrangements – for which there 
would be little or no need in the absence of trade barriers – is adding complexity to international 
economic relations. In some cases those arrangements are leading to trade and investment diversion 
rather than creation. 
  The reluctance to reduce trade distortions is almost never because such policy reform involves 
government treasury outlays. On the contrary, except in the case of a handful of low-income countries 
                                                 
1 This paper draws on Anderson (2004 and 2005a,b). 
2 Not all subsidies are welfare-reducing, and in some cases a subsidy-cum-tax will be optimal to overcome a gap between 
private and social costs that cannot be bridged à la Coase (1960). Throughout this paper all references to ‘cutting subsidies’ 





still heavily dependent on trade taxes for government revenue, such reform may well benefit the treasury 
(by raising income and/or consumption tax revenues more than trade tax revenues fall, not to mention 
any payments foregone because of cuts to subsidy programs). Rather, distortions remain largely because 
further trade liberalization and subsidy cuts redistribute jobs, income and wealth in ways that those in 
government fear will reduce their chances of remaining in power (and possibly their own wealth in 
countries where corruption is rife). The challenge involves finding politically attractive ways to phase 
out remaining distortions to world markets for agricultural and other goods, services, capital and 
potentially even labour.  
This paper focuses on distortions at national borders plus trade-distorting agricultural production 
subsidies. While global in coverage, the paper distinguishes between policies of developed countries and 
those of developing (including former socialist and least-developed) countries. It is structured as 
follows: Section 1 summarizes the arguments for removing trade distortions, along with critiques by 
sceptics. This includes examining not only the economic benefits and costs but also the social and 
environmental consequences of such reform, to make the case that opening markets is a worthy cause. It 
also makes the case for why agriculture needs to be included in such negotiations even though it is 
politically sensitive. Section 2 provides new estimates of the potential economic benefits from such a 
round, relative to those from (a) moving to complete free trade and (b) forming a Free Trade Area  of the 
Americas (FTAA). Section 3 discusses how to keep costs of adjustment low. The final section stresses 
what is needed to ensure the Doha round is a significant step forward. 
 
 
1.  The arguments for (and against) removing subsidies and trade barriers 
 
  Even before examining the empirical estimates of the potential benefits and costs from grasping 
trade-liberalizing opportunities, the case can be made that such reform in principle is beneficial 
economically. It then remains to examine whether particular reforms are also at least benign in terms of 
social and environmental outcomes. The latter is particularly important because there are many non-
economists who believe or assume the social and/or environmental consequences are adverse and seek 
to persuade others through such means as mass (and sometimes violent) street protests, as occurred at 
the WTO Trade Ministerial in Seattle in late 1999. 
  The standard comparative static analysis of national gains from international trade emphasises 
the economic benefits from production specialization and exchange so as to exploit comparative 
advantage in situations where a nation’s costs of production and/or preferences differ from those in the 
rest of the world. This is part of the more general theory of the welfare effects of distortions in a trading 
economy, as summarized by Bhagwati (1971). Domestic industries become more productive as those 
with a comparative advantage expand by drawing resources from those previously protected industries 
that grow slower or contract following reform. 
The static gains from trade tend to be greater as a share of national output the smaller the 
economy, particularly where economies of scale in production have not been fully exploited and where 
consumers (including firms importing intermediate inputs) value variety so that intra- as well as inter-
industry trade can flourish. In such cases the more-efficient firms within expanding industries tend to 
take over the less efficient ones. Indeed theory and empirical studies suggest the shifting of resources 
within an industry may be more welfare-improving than shifts between industries (Melitz 1999; Trefler 
2001). They are also greater the more trade barriers have allowed imperfect competition to prevail in the 
domestic marketplace, which again is more common in smaller economies where industries have 






Dynamic economic gains from own-country reform 
 
  To the standard comparative static analysis needs to be added links between trade and economic 
growth. The mechanisms by which openness contributes to growth are gradually getting to be better 
understood, thanks to the pioneering work of such theorists as Grossman and Helpman (1991), Rivera-
Batiz and Romer (1991) and the literature those studies spawned. There are several channels through 
which openness to trade can affect an economy’s growth rate. They include the scale of the market when 
knowledge is embodied in the products traded, the degree of redundant knowledge creation that is 
avoided through openness (Romer 1994), and the effect of knowledge spillovers.  
More importantly from a policy maker’s viewpoint, the available empirical evidence strongly 
supports the view that open economies grow faster (see the survey by USITC 1997). Important 
econometric studies of the linkage between trade reform and the rate of economic growth include those 
by Sachs and Warner (1995) and Frankel and Romer (1999). More recent studies also provide some 
indirect supportive econometric evidence. For example, freeing up the importation of intermediate and 
capital goods promotes investments that increase growth (Wacziarg 2001). Also, developing economies 
grow faster the higher the ratio of imported to domestically produced capital goods (Lee 1995; 
Mazumdar 2001). Rodrigeuz and Rodrik (2001) examine a number of such studies and claim the results 
they surveyed are not robust. However, in a more recent study that revisits the Sachs and Warner data 
and then provides new time-series evidence, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) show that dates of trade 
liberalization do characterize breaks in investment and GDP growth rates. Specifically, for the 1950-
1998 period, countries that have liberalized their trade (raising their trade-to-GDP ratio by an average of 
5 percentage points) have enjoyed on average 1.5 percentage points higher GDP growth compared with 
their pre-reform rate. There have also been myriad case studies of liberalization episodes. In a survey of 
36 of them, Greenaway (1993) reminds us that many things in addition to trade policies were changing 
during the studied cases, so ascribing causality is not easy. That, together with some econometric studies 
that fail to find that positive link, has led Freeman (2003) to suggest the promise of raising the rate of 
economic growth through trade reform has been overstated. The same could be (and has been) said 
about the contributions to growth of such things as investments in education, health, agricultural 
research, and so on (Easterly 2001). A more-general and more-robust conclusion that Easterly draws 
from empirical evidence, though, is that people respond to incentives. Hence getting incentives right in 
factor and product markets is crucial – and removing unwarranted subsidies and trade barriers is an 
important part of that process. Additional evidence from 13 new case studies reported in Wacziarg and 
Welch (2003) adds further empirical support to that view, as does the fact that there are no examples of 
autarkic economies that have enjoyed sustained economic growth, in contrast to the many examples 
since the 1960s of reformed economies that boomed after opening up. 
Specifically, economies that commit to less market intervention tend to attract more investment 
funds, ceteris paribus, which raise their stocks of capital (through greater aggregate savings or at the 
expense of other economies’ capital stocks). More-open economies also tend to be more innovative, 
because of greater trade in intellectual capital (information, ideas and technologies, sometimes but not 
only in the form of purchasable intellectual property). Trade liberalization can thereby lead not just to a 
larger capital stock and a one-off increase in productivity but also to higher rates of capital accumulation 
and productivity growth in the reforming economy because of the way reform energises entrepreneurs. 
For those higher growth rates to be sustained, though, there is widespread agreement that governments 
also need to (a) have in place effective institutions to efficiently allocate and protect property rights, (b) 
allow domestic factor and product markets to function freely, and (c) maintain macroeconomic and 









Why, then, do countries retain protectionist policies? 
 
  Despite the evident economic gains from removing trade distortions, most countries retain 
protection from foreign competition for at least some of their industries. Numerous reasons have been 
suggested as to why a country imposes trade barriers in the first place (infant industry assistance, 
unemployment prevention, balance of payments maintenance, tax revenue raising, etc.), but all of them 
are found wanting in almost all circumstances in that a lower-cost domestic policy instrument is 
available to meet each of those objectives (Corden 1997; Bhagwati 1988). The most compelling 
explanation for their persistence is a political economy one. The changes in product prices that result 
from trade liberalization or subsidy cuts necessarily change the prices for the services of productive 
factors such as land, labour and capital. Hence even though the aggregate income and wealth of a nation 
may be expected to grow when trade distortions are reduced, not everyone need gain and social safety 
nets, where they exist, typically provide only partial compensation for such losses. This is the source of 
resistance to policy reforms: the expected losses in jobs, income and wealth are concentrated in the 
hands of a few who are prepared to support politicians who resist protection cuts, while the gains are 
sufficiently small per consumer and export firm and are distributed sufficiently widely as to make it not 
worthwhile for those potential gainers to get together to lobby for reform, particularly given their greater 
free-rider problem in acting collectively (Hillman 1989; Grossman and Helpman 1994). Thus the 
observed pattern of protection in a country at a point in time may well be an equilibrium outcome in a 
national political market for policy intervention. 
 
What can induce reductions in subsidies and trade barriers? 
 
That political market equilibrium may be altered from time to time. One way is through better 
dissemination (e.g., by national or international bureaucrats, think tanks, local export industries, foreign 
import suppliers) of more-convincing information on the benefits to consumers, exporters and the 
overall economy from reducing subsidies and trade distortions, to balance the views of single-issue non-
government organizations (NGOs), labour unions and the like who tend to focus only on the (often over-
stated) costs of reform to their constituents. During the past two decades that spreading of more 
balanced benefit/cost information has contributed to unilateral economic reforms and a consequent 
opening to trade in numerous developing countries as well as richer countries such as Australia and New 
Zealand. More recently several major NGOs, together with the OECD Secretariat, have begun to focus 
on providing better information about the wastefulness of environmentally harmful subsidies – and those 
efforts have already started to have an impact (e.g. in reducing coal mining subsidies in Europe). 
Another way the political equilibrium is altered is technological innovation. The information and 
telecommunications revolution of the past two decades, for example, has dramatically lowered the costs 
of doing business across national borders, just as happened with the arrival of steamships and the 
telegraph during the latter part of the nineteenth century. That increased trading opportunity has made 
(actual or potential) exporters more eager to get together to counter the anti-trade lobbying of import-
protected groups and NGOs. 
                                                 
3 There is strong evidence that trade reform in general is not only good for economic growth but also, and partly because of 





A country’s political equilibrium could be upset also by trade opening by one or more other 
countries, in so far as those reforms alter international prices and volumes of trade and foreign 
investment and provide greater market access opportunities for exporters. Such opening abroad also 
adds to the evidence of the net gains and (particularly in the case of phased reforms) the relatively low 
adjustment costs associated with trade reform, making it easier for exporters to counter the alarmist 
lobbying of protectionists.  
A coincidence of this and the previous two types of shocks has given rise to the latest wave of 
globalization. This is raising not only the rewards to economies practising good economic governance 
but also the cost of retaining poor economic governance. Just as financial capital can now flow into a 
well-managed economy more easily and quickly than ever before, so it can equally quickly be 
withdrawn if confidence in that economy’s governance is shaken – as the East Asian financial crisis of 
the late 1990s demonstrated all too clearly. A crucial element of good economic governance is a 
commitment to a permanently open international trade and payments regime (along with sound domestic 
policies such as secure property rights and prudent monetary and fiscal policies).  
In seeking to find politically expedient ways to open their economies, governments are 
increasingly looking for opportunities to do so bilaterally, regionally or multilaterally. The reason is that 
the political market equilibrium in two or more countries can be altered in favour of liberalism through 
an exchange of product market access. If country A allows more imports, it may well harm its import-
competing producers if there are insufficient compensation mechanisms; but if this liberalization is done 
in return for country A’s trading partners lowering their barriers to A’s exports, the producers of those 
exports will be better off. The latter extra benefit may be sufficiently greater than the loss to A’s import-
competing producers that A’s liberalizing politicians too become net gainers in terms of electoral, 
financial or other support in return for negotiating a trade agreement. When politicians in the countries 
trading with A also see the possibility for gaining from such an exchange of market access, for equal and 
opposite reasons, prospects for trade negotiations are ripe.
4  
Such gains from trade negotiations involving exchange of market access are potentially greater 
nationally and globally, the larger the number of countries involved and the broader the product and 
issues coverage of the negotiations. That is the logic behind negotiating multilaterally with nearly 150 
WTO member countries over a wide range of sectors and issues. That WTO process is becoming 
increasingly cumbersome, however, which has led countries also to negotiate bilaterally or regionally in 
the hope that faster and deeper integration will result. Preferential free trade areas involving just a subset 
of countries need not be welfare-enhancing for all participant nations, however, because of trade 
diversion away from the lowest-cost supplier; and non-participants in the rest of the world may be made 
worse off too (Pomfret 1997; Schiff and Winters 2003). Hence the need for empirical analysis of the 
likely gains from different types of prospective trade agreements. 
 
Why all the fuss over agriculture? 
 
In such international trade negotiations, food and agricultural policies often turn out to be the 
most problematic area. For example, agriculture caused long delays to the Uruguay Round in the late 
1980s and 1990s, and it is again proving to be the major stumbling block in the Doha round. It 
contributed substantially to the failure of the September 2003 Trade Ministerial Meeting in Cancún to 
reach agreement on how to proceed with the round, after which it took another nine months before a 
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consensus was reached on the Doha work program, otherwise referred to as the July Framework 
Agreement (WTO 2004).  
It is ironic that agricultural policy is so contentious, given its small and declining importance in 
the global economy. The sector’s share of global GDP has fallen from around one-tenth in the 1960s to 
little more than one-thirtieth today. In developed countries the sector accounts for only 1.8 percent of 
GDP and only a little more of full-time equivalent employment. Mirroring that decline, agriculture’s 
share of global merchandise trade has more than halved over the past three decades, dropping from 22 
percent to 9 percent. For developing countries its importance has fallen even more rapidly, from 42 to 11 
percent.  
Since policies affecting this declining sector are so politically sensitive, there are always self-
interested groups suggesting it be sidelined in trade negotiations – as indeed it has in numerous sub-
global preferential trading agreements, and was in the GATT prior to the Uruguay Round.
5 That, 
however, would do a major disservice to many of the world’s poorest people, namely those in farm 
households in developing countries. It is precisely because agricultural earnings are so important to a 
large number of developing countries that the highly protective farm policies of a few wealthy countries 
are being targeted by them in the WTO negotiations: better access to rich countries’ markets for their 
farm produce is a high priority for them. 
Some developing countries have been granted greater access to developed-country markets for a 
selection of products under various preferential agreements. Examples are the EU’s provisions for 
former colonies in the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) program and more recently for Least 
Developed Countries under the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement. Likewise, the United States has 
its Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). These schemes 
reduce demands for developed-country farm policy reform from preference-receiving countries, but they 
exacerbate the concerns of other countries excluded from such programs and thereby made worse off 
through declining terms of trade – and they may even be worsening rather than improving aggregate 
global and even developing country welfare.  
Apart from that, many in developing countries feel they did not get a good deal out of the 
Uruguay Round. They therefore are determined in the Doha round that they get significantly more 
market access commitments from developed countries before they contemplate opening their own 
markets further. Greater market access for developing countries exporters, and especially for poor 
producers in those countries, is to be found in agriculture (and to a lesser extent in textiles and clothing). 
This can be seen from a glance at Table 1. It shows that developing country exporters face an average 
tariff (even after taking account of preferences) of 16 percent for agriculture and food, and 8 percent for 
textiles and clothing, compared with just 1 percent for other manufactures. The average tariff on 
agricultural goods imported by developing countries themselves is high too, suggesting even more 
reason why attention should focus on that sector (along with textiles) in the multilateral reform process 
embodied in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). 
If agriculture were to be ignored in the Doha negotiations, there is the risk that agricultural 
protection would start rising again. That is what happened throughout the course of industrial 
development in Europe and Northeast Asia (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986, Lindert 1991). It was 
only with the establishment of the World Trade Organization, in 1995, that agricultural trade was 
brought under multilateral disciplines via the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). That 
Agreement was ambitious in scope, converting all agricultural protection to tariffs, and limiting 
increases in virtually all tariffs through tariff bindings. Unfortunately, the process of converting non-
                                                 
5 The rules of the GATT are intended, in principle, to cover all trade in goods. However, in practice, trade in agricultural 
products was largely excluded from their remit as a consequence of a number of exceptions. Details are to be found in 





tariff barriers into tariffs (inelegantly termed “tariffication”) provided numerous opportunities for 
backsliding that greatly reduced the effectiveness of the agreed disciplines (Hathaway and Ingco 1996). 
In developing countries, the option for “ceiling bindings” allowed countries to set their bindings at high 
levels, frequently unrelated to the previously prevailing levels of protection. Hence agricultural import 
tariffs are still very high in both rich and poor countries, with bound rates half as high again as MFN 
applied rates (Table 2). 
As well, agricultural producers in some countries are supported by export subsidies (still 
tolerated within the WTO only for agriculture) and by domestic support measures. Together with tariffs 
and other barriers to agricultural imports, these measures support farm incomes and encourage 
agricultural output to varying extents. The market price support component also typically raises 
domestic consumer prices of farm products. Figure 1 shows the value and the percentage of total farm 
receipts from these support policy measures, called the Producer Support Estimate or PSE by the OECD 
secretariat. For OECD members as a group, the PSE was almost the same in 2001-03 as in 1986-88, at 
about $240 billion per year. But because of growth in the sector, as a percentage of total farm receipts 
(inclusive of support) that represents a fall from 37 to 31 percent.  
Agricultural protection levels remain very high in these developed countries, especially when 
bearing in mind that 1986-88 was a period of historically very low international food prices and hence 
above-trend PSEs. And, as Figure 2 shows, the PSEs have fallen least in the most-protective OECD 
countries. By contrast, tariff protection to OECD manufacturing has fallen over the past 60 years from a 
level similar to that for OECD agriculture today (above 30 per cent nominal rate of protection) to only 
one-tenth of that now. This means far more resources have been retained in agricultural production in 
developed countries – and hence fewer in developing countries – than would have been the case if 
protection had been phased down in both agriculture and manufacturing simultaneously.  
Nonetheless, the achievements of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture provide some 
scope for optimism about what might be achieved via the WTO as part of the DDA and beyond. The 
current Doha round has the advantage over the Uruguay Round of beginning from the framework of 
rules and disciplines agreed in that previous Round. In particular, it has the three clearly identified 
“pillars” of market access, export subsidies, and domestic support on which to focus. True, it took more 
than three years to agree on a framework for the current negotiations, reached on at the end of July 2004 
(WTO 2004), but now that July Framework Agreement is likely to guide the negotiations for some time. 
It therefore provides a strong basis for undertaking ex ante analysis of various options potentially 
available to WTO members during the Doha negotiations.   
 
What about the social and environmental consequences of trade reform? 
 
  Trade liberalization in recent years has attracted a considerable amount of attention of NGOs, as 
witnessed by their presence on the streets of cities where trade ministers meet (e.g., during the WTO 
Ministerial in Seattle in late 1999). The groups attracted see trade reform as contributing to the spread of 
capitalism and in particular of multinational firms, and believe those aspects of globalization add to 
innumerable social and environmental ills in both rich and poor countries. But just as the traditional 
economic arguments for protection have been found wanting, so too have the social and environmental 
ones both conceptually and empirically. For example, there has not been a systematic ‘race to the 
bottom’ in environmental or labour standards of rich countries as a result of trade and foreign direct 
investment growth, and in poor countries foreign corporations often have among the highest 
environmental and labour standards (Bhagwati and Hudec 1996). Nor has trade growth been a major 
contributor to the stagnation of wages of unskilled workers in OECD countries (Greenaway and Nelson 





The number of such claims by anti-globalization groups – almost invariably not supported by 
credible empirical evidence – makes it a huge task to address them all systematically. However, 
comprehensive yet very readable responses to those claims can be found in two recent books, by 
Bhagwati (2004) and Wolf (2004). 
 
 
2.  The opportunities provided by the Doha round and FTA negotiations to 
reduce trade barriers 
 
The gains from reducing government interventions in markets has been well known since the 
writing of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations more than two centuries ago, and popular magazines such as 
The Economist and more and more daily newspapers continue to remind the public of the virtues of 
market opening.
6 Even so, greater dissemination of empirical information on the net economic benefits 
of reducing trade distortions, to balance the often-exaggerated claims by potential losers and their 
supporters of the adjustment costs of reform, can no doubt assist the liberalization process. Empirical 
studies can also shed better light and take some of the heat out of debates about whether, in the presence 
of domestic distortions such as undertaxed pollution, subsidy and trade reform is welfare-reducing. Such 
studies can also point to the domestic policy reforms that should accompany trade reform so as to 
guarantee not only national welfare improvement in aggregate but also that there is no significant left-
behind group, no unexpected new damage to the environment, etc. Clearly there is an opportunity for 
well-meaning interest groups, think tanks and national and international economic agencies to spend 
more money and resources on such empirical studies, and in particular on the effective dissemination of 
their findings. In an idealistic world in which such studies were able to persuade all governments to fully 
liberalize their trade unilaterally, the benefit derived from that opportunity would be measured by the 
gain from moving the world to one free of subsidies and trade barriers. Unlikely though such an 
outcome may seem in the foreseeable future, it provides a benchmark against which all other 
opportunities to partially meet this challenge can be measured. 
Among the more-feasible opportunities available today for encouraging trade negotiations to 
stimulate significant market opening, the most obvious is a non-preferential legally binding partial trade 
liberalization following the WTO’s current Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations. That round 
was launched in Doha, the capital of Qatar, in 2001 with the intention of completing negotiations at the 
end of 2004, when implementation of the last of the Uruguay Round commitments under WTO were 
completed. But for comparison it is also worth examining the trade negotiating opportunity to negotiate 
a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which potentially would bring together all the economies of 
North, Central and South America. This is by far the largest and most ambitious preferential agreement 
currently in prospect: it dwarfs the bilateral FTA negotiations the US and EU are having with a range of 
other countries, and it is also more advanced than other current proposals for FTAs such as in South 
Asia and those involving China. 
The estimates below of the potential global economic welfare gains from trade reform are 
generated using computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of the global economy. The CGE 
welfare gains refer to the equivalent variation in income (EV) as a result of each of the shocks 
described.
7 While not without their shortcomings (see Francois 2000, Whalley 2000, Anderson 2003), 
                                                 
6 On the intellectual history of the virtues of free trade, see Bhagwati (1988, Ch. 2) and Irwin (1996). Bhagwati notes that the 
virtues of division of labour and exchange were cited twenty four centuries ago in Plato’s Republic (see the back cover of the 
October 1985 issue of the Journal of Political Economy). 
7 EV is defined as the income that consumers would be willing to forego and still have the same level of well-being after as 





CGE models are far superior for current purposes to partial equilibrium models, which fail to capture the 
economy-wide nature of the adjustments to reform whereby some sectors expand when others contract 
and release capital and labour; and they are also superior to macroeconometric models which typically 
lack sufficient sectoral detail (Francois and Reinert 1997). They were first used in multilateral trade 
reform analysis in ex post assessments of the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations in the late 1970s/early 
1980s (Cline et al. 1978; Deardorff and Stern 1979, 1986; Whalley 1985). Since then they have been 
used increasingly during and following the Uruguay Round, as shown in the various studies summarized 
in Martin and Winters (1996). 
Empirical comparative static studies of the economic welfare gains from trade liberalization 
typically generate positive gains for the world and for most participating countries. (Exceptions are 
when a country’s welfare is reduced more by a terms of trade change or reduced rents from preferential 
market access quotas than it is boosted by improvements due to reallocating its resources away from 
protected industries.) When increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition (IRS/MC) are 
assumed instead of constant returns to scale and perfect competition (CRS/PC), and when trade in not 
just goods but also services is liberalized, the estimates of potential gains can be increased several fold. 
A few economists have also examined the effects of lowering barriers to international capital flows or 
labour movements, and some have included estimates of a lowering of trade costs as a result of trade 
facilitation measures such as streamlining customs-clearance procedures.  
 
Removing all merchandise trade barriers and agricultural subsidies globally  
 
Only a few CGE modelling studies have reported simulations of complete liberalization of trade. 
The most recent one, which makes use of the newly-released GTAP protection database Version 6.05 
and the latest version of the World Bank’s Linkage model, is provided in Anderson, Martin and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2005). That study also provides comparable estimates of partial reforms as proposed for 
the Doha round. The following are among the key messages that emerge from that study’s estimates of 
the gains from removing all merchandise trade barriers and farm subsidies:  
The potential gains from further global trade reform are huge. Global gains from trade reform 
post-2004 are estimated to be large even if dynamic gains and gains from economies of scale and 
increased competition are ignored. Freeing all merchandise trade and agricultural subsidies is estimated 
to boost global welfare by nearly $300 billion per year by 2015 (Table 3), plus whatever productivity 
effects that reform would generate.  
Developing countries would gain disproportionately from such global trade reform. The 
developing countries would enjoy 32 percent of the global gain from completely freeing all merchandise 
trade (Table 4a), well above their one-fifth share of global GDP. Their welfare would increase by 1.2 
percent, compared with an increase of just 0.6 percent for developed countries. The developing 
countries’ higher share is partly because they have relatively high tariffs themselves (so they would reap 
substantial efficiency gains from reforming their own protection), and partly because their exports are 
more concentrated in farm and textile products whose tariffs in developed country markets are 
exceptionally high (Table 1) – notwithstanding non-reciprocal tariff preferences for many developing 
countries, which contribute to the losses associated with terms of trade deterioration shown in the middle 
column of Table 3.  
Benefits could be as much from South-South as from South-North trade reform. Trade reform by 
developing countries is almost as important economically to those countries as is reform by developed 
countries, including from agricultural liberalization (Table 4b). Hence choosing to delay their own 
reforms or reforming less than developed countries, and thereby holding back South-South trade growth, 





Agriculture is where cuts are needed most. To realize that potential gain from opening up goods 
markets, it is in agriculture that by far the greatest cuts in bound tariffs and subsidies are required. This 
is because of the very high rates of assistance in that sector relative to other sectors. Food and 
agricultural policies are responsible for almost two-thirds of the global gain foregone because of 
merchandise trade distortions (column 1 of Table 4a) – despite the fact that agriculture and food 
processing account for less than 10 percent of world trade and less than 4 percent of global GDP. From 
the point of view of welfare of developing countries, agriculture is almost as important as it is for the 
world as a whole: their gains from global agricultural liberalization represent almost two-thirds of their 
total potential gains, which compares with just one-quarter from textiles and clothing and one-eighth 
from other merchandise liberalization (Table 4b).  
In developing countries the poor would gain most from multilateral trade reform. Full global 
merchandise trade liberalization would raise real factor returns for the poorest households most. This is 
clear from Table 5, where for developing countries the biggest factor price rise is for farm land, 
followed by unskilled labor. Since farmers and other low-skilled workers constitute the vast majority of 
the poor in developing countries, such reform would reduce both inequity and poverty.  
 
Prospective gains from Doha partial liberalization 
 
  That same study by Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005) examines the July 2004 
Framework Agreement among WTO members and provides a range of scenarios that might emerge in 
subsequent negotiations. The lessons drawn from that exercise include the following: 
Large cuts in domestic support commitments are needed to erase binding overhang. In turning 
from the potential gains from full liberalization to what might be achievable under a Doha partial reform 
package, the devil is going to be in the details. For example, commitments on domestic support for 
farmers are so much higher than actual support levels at present that the 20 percent cut in the total bound 
AMS promised in the July Framework Agreement as an early installment will require no actual support 
reductions for any WTO member. Indeed a cut as huge as 75 percent for those with most domestic 
support is needed to get some action, and even then it would only require cuts in 2001 levels of domestic 
support for four WTO actors: the US (by 28 percent), the EU (by 18 percent), Norway (by 16 percent) 
and Australia by 10 percent – and the EU and Australia have already introduced reforms of that order 
since 2001, so may need to do no further cutting under even that formula.  
Large cuts in bound rates are needed also to erase binding overhang in agricultural tariffs.  
Table 2 shows there is substantial binding overhang in agricultural tariffs: the average bound rate in 
developed countries is almost twice as high as the average applied rate, and in developing countries the 
ratio is even greater. Thus large reductions in bound rates are needed before it is possible to bring about 
any improvements in market access. To bring the global average actual agricultural tariff down by one-
third, bound rates would have to be reduced for developed countries by at least 45 percent, and up to 75 
percent for the highest tariffs, under a tiered formula.   
A complex tiered formula may be little better than a proportional tariff cut. It turns out that, 
because of the large binding overhang, a tiered formula for cutting agricultural tariffs would generate not 
much more global welfare – and no more welfare for developing countries as a group – than a 
proportional cut of the same average size (columns 1 and 2 of Tables 6, 7 and 8). This suggests there 
may be little value in arguing over the finer details of a complex tiered formula just for the sake of 
reducing tariff escalation. Instead, a simple tariff cap of, say, 100 or even 200 percent could achieve 
essentially the same outcome. 
Even large cuts in bound tariffs do little if “Sensitive Products” are allowed, except if a cap 





farm products, much of the prospective gain from Doha could evaporate. Even if only 2 percent of HS6 
agricultural tariff lines in developed countries are classified as sensitive (and 4 percent in developing 
countries, to incorporate also their “Special Products” demand), and are thereby subject to just a 15 
percent tariff cut (as a substitute for the TRQ expansion mentioned in the Framework Agreement), the 
welfare gains from global agricultural reform would shrink by three-quarters. However, if at the same 
time any product with a bound tariff in excess of 200 percent had to reduce it to that cap rate, however, 
the welfare gain would shrink by ‘only’ one-third (columns 3 and 4 of Tables 6, 7 and 8). 
High binding overhang means developing countries would have to make few cuts. Given the high 
binding overhang of developing countries, even with their high tariffs – and even if tiered formulae are 
used to cut highest bindings most – relatively few of them would have to cut their actual tariffs and 
subsidies at all (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2005). That is even truer if “Special Products” are subjected 
to smaller cuts and developing countries exercise their right – as laid out in the July Framework 
Agreement – to undertake lesser cuts (zero in the case of LDCs) than developed countries. Politically 
this makes it easier for developing and least developed countries to offer big cuts on bound rates – but it 
also means the benefits to them are smaller than if they had a smaller binding overhang. 
Cotton subsidy cuts would help cotton-exporting developing countries. The removal of cotton 
subsidies (which have raised producer prices by well over 50 percent in the US and EU – see Sumner 
2005) would raise the export price of cotton (although not equally across all exporters because of 
product differentiation). If those subsidies were removed as part of freeing all merchandise trade, that 
price rise is estimated to be 8 percent for Brazil but less for Sub-Saharan Africa on average. However, 
cotton exports from Sub-Saharan Africa would be a huge 75 percent larger, and the share of all 
developing countries in global exports would be 85 percent instead of 56 percent in 2015, vindicating 
those countries’ efforts to ensure cotton subsidies receive specific attention in the Doha negotiations. 
Expanding non-agricultural market access would add substantially to the gains from 
agricultural reform. By adding a 50 percent cut to non-agricultural tariffs by developed countries (and 
33 percent by developing countries and zero by LDCs) to the tiered formula cut to agricultural tariffs 
would double the gain from Doha for developing countries (compare Scenarios 1 and 5 in Tables 6, 7 
and 8). That would bring the global gain to $95 billion from Doha merchandise liberalization, which is a 
sizable one-third of the potential welfare gain from full liberalization of $278 billion. Adding services 
reform would of course boost that welfare gain even more.  
Including non-agricultural tariff reform together with agricultural reform helps to balance the 
exchange of “concessions”. The agricultural reforms would boost the annual value of world trade in 
2015 by less than one-fifth what would happen if non-agricultural tariffs were also reduced. The latter’s 
inclusion also would help balance the exchange of “concessions” in terms of increases in bilateral trade 
values: in that case developing countries’ exports to high-income countries would then be 2.9 percent 
higher, which is close to the 2.7 percent increase in high-income countries’ exports to developing 
countries. With only agricultural reform, the latter’s bilateral trade growth would be only half the 
former’s (Table 9). 
Most developing countries gain, and the rest could if they reform more. Most of the DC gains 
from that comprehensive Doha scenario go to numerous large developing countries, notably Brazil, 
Argentina and Other Latin America plus India, Thailand and South Africa plus others in southern 
Africa. The rest of Sub-Saharan Africa loses less in the comprehensive scenarios as compared with just 
the agricultural reform scenarios – but it still loses slightly. Those other SSA countries simply are not 
reducing their very high bound tariffs enough in these scenarios to get sufficient efficiency gains to 
offset the terms of trade losses suffered either as net food importers, or as recipients of tariff preferences 
that have eroded with the decline in high-income countries’ MFN tariffs, or because of the combined 
export growth from reforming economies with similar export compositions. 





Preference erosion may be less of an issue than commonly assumed. Some least developed 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere appear to be slight losers in our Doha simulations when 
developed countries cut their tariffs and those LDCs choose not to reform at all themselves. These 
simulations overstate the benefits of tariff preferences for LDCs, however, since they ignore the trade-
dampening effect of complex rules of origin and the grabbing of much of the rents by developed-country 
importers. Even if they were to be losers after correcting for those realities, it remains true that 
preference-receiving countries could always be compensated for preference erosion via increased aid at 
relatively very small cost to current preference providers – and in the process other developing countries 
currently hurt by LCD preferences would enjoy greater access to the markets of reforming developed 
countries. 
Farm output and employment would grow in developing countries under Doha. Despite a few 
low-income countries losing slightly under our Doha scenarios when they choose to reform little 
themselves, in all the developing countries and regions shown the levels of output and employment on 
farms expand. It is only in the most protected developed countries of Western Europe, Northeast Asia 
and the US that these levels would fall – and even there it is only by small amounts, contrary to the 
predictions of scaremongers who claim agriculture would be decimated in reforming countries (Table 
10). Even if there was a move to completely free merchandise trade, the developed countries’ share of 
the world’s primary agricultural GDP by 2015 would be only slightly lower at 24 instead of 28 percent 
(but their share of global agricultural exports would be diminished considerably more: from 45 to 29 
percent).  
Developing countries could trade off Special and Differential Treatment for more market access.  
If developing countries were to tone down their call for Special and Differential Treatment, in terms of 
wanting smaller cuts and longer phase-in periods, reciprocity means they could expect bigger tariff and 
subsidy cuts from developed countries. Similarly, if they were to forego their call for lesser cuts for 
“Special Products”, they could demand that developed countries forego their call for some “Sensitive 
Products” to be subject to smaller tariff cuts. A comparison of Scenarios 5 and 6 in Tables 6, 7 and 8 
shows that the economic payoffs for low-income countries even if high-income countries do not 
reciprocate with larger offers is considerable. Moreover, by embracing those options to reform more in 
the context of the Doha round would be to take the high moral ground and make it harder for high-
income countries to resist the call to respond with larger reforms themselves.  
 
Prospective gains from Removing intra-American trade barriers following the FTAA negotiations 
 
  The negotiations to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) – the largest such FTA 
negotiations currently under way or in prospect – have begun but are stalling periodically. The reason 
for considering them here is simply to point out that the potential global gains from such an FTA are 
only a small fraction of those obtainable from multilateral negotiation (because the major economies of 
Europe and North America are already well integrated and so any new initiatives involve relatively 
small economies joining one of those hubs or integrating among themselves). Two studies that examine 
both a multilateral reform (a global 50 percent cut in tariffs, which is somewhat bigger than the most 
ambitious of the above Doha scenarios where manufacturing is liberalized by 50 percent but agriculture 
by only about one-third) and the FTAA are by Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2003) and Harrison, 
Rutherford, Tarr and Gurgel (2003). The global gain from the FTAA in the BDS study is estimated to be 
just one-twelth of that from a 50 per cent multilateral trade liberalization, and for the HRTG study the 
difference is even greater.  
FTAs of this type are pursued nonetheless for a wide range of reasons, including preferential 





dumping by that partner, and deeper and faster integration than has been possible or is in prospect 
through the multilateral reform route (Schiff and Winters 2003). The gains to just one or a few 
developing economies from joining with North America or the EU may be non-trivial, but so too would 
be the gains from a similar degree of multilateral reform. According to the HRTG study, a multilateral 
reform involving even just a 25 per cent reduction in merchandise tariffs would benefit South America 
more than the FTAA, for example.   Moreover,  such  preferential  agreements  can  harm  excluded 
developing and/or developed countries through trade diversion. Indeed the estimated gains to FTAA 
members are nearly fully offset by losses to excluded economies, according to the HRTG study.  
 
 
3.  Costs of reducing trade barriers 
 
The above benefits from reform are not costless of course. Expenditure on costs of adjustment 
for firms and workers, as reform forces some industries to downsize or close to allow others to expand, 
are ignored in the full-employment CGE models discussed above. There are also social costs to 
consider. They include social safety net provisions in so far as such schemes are developed/drawn on by 
losers from reform (e.g., unemployment payments plus training grants to build up new skills so 
displaced workers can earn the same wage as before), and perhaps increased costs of crime in so far as 
its incidence rises with transitional unemployment.  
All three types are one-off costs to weigh against the non-stop flow of economic benefits from 
reform. The private and social costs of adjustment tend to be smaller, the longer the phase-in period or 
smaller the tariff or subsidy cut per year (Furusawa and Lai 1999). Also, CGE simulation studies suggest 
that the annual change in an industry’s terms of trade due to phased trade reform is typically very minor 
relative to changes due to exchange rate fluctuations, technological improvements, preference shifts and 
other economic shocks and structural developments associated with normal economic growth.  
Estimates of the magnitude of those costs are difficult to generate, but all available estimates 
suggest they are minor relative to the benefits from reform. An early study by Magee (1972) for the 
United States estimated the cost of job changes including temporary unemployment to be one-eighth of 
the benefits from tariff and quota elimination initially. Even assuming that transition took as many as 
five years, he estimated a benefit/cost ratio of 25. A subsequent study which examined a 50 per cent cut 
in US tariffs (but not quotas) came up with a similar benefit/cost estimate (Baldwin, Mutti and 
Richardson 1980). In more recent debates about trade and labour, analysts have had difficulty finding a 
strong link between import expansion and increased unemployment (see Greenaway and Nelson 2002). 
One example is a study of the four largest EU economies’ imports from East Asia (Bentivogli and 
Pagano 1999). Another European example is a study of the UK footwear industry: liberalizing that 
market would incur unemployment costs only in the first year, because of the high job turnover in that 
industry, and those estimated costs are less than 1.5 per cent of the benefits from cutting that protection 
(Winters and Takacs 1991). A similar-sized estimate is provided by de Melo and Tarr (1990) using a 
CGE model that focuses just on US textile, steel and auto protection cuts and drawing on estimates of 
the cost of earnings lost by displaced workers (later reported by Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993). 
For developing countries also the evidence seems to suggest low costs of adjustment, not least because 
trade reform typically causes a growth spurt (Krueger 1983). In a study of 13 liberalization efforts for 
nine developing countries, Michaely et al. (1991) found only one example where employment was not 
higher within a year. A similar study for Mauritius by Milner and Wright (1998) also found trade 
opening to be associated with employment growth rather than decline. 
If the adjustment costs are so small and may lead to more rather than less jobs even during the 





losses in jobs and asset values are very obvious and concentrated whereas the gains in terms of new job 
and investment opportunities are thinly spread, are less-easily attributed to the trade reform, and are 
taken up often by people other than those losing from the reform. As discussed above, the few losers are 
prepared to support politicians who resist protection cuts, while the gains are sufficiently small per 
consumer and unassisted firm as to make it not worthwhile for those many potential gainers to get 
together to lobby for reform, particularly given their greater free-rider problem in acting collectively 
(Olsen 1965). Hence the need for publicly funded trade policy think-tanks and the like to play an 
advocacy role. 
An example of the role analysis can play has to do with effects on developing countries of 
reforms to support for agriculture in OECD economies. The primary channel for such effects is through 
the terms of trade, which in turn depend in part on whether a country is a net exporter or importer of the 
affected OECD products. Long-term support for agriculture in OECD countries, coupled with often-
negative assistance to farmers in many developing countries, has left developing countries as a group 
dependent on imports of these subsidized products. As a result, an across-the-board cut in all domestic 
support for OECD agriculture leads to welfare losses for some developing countries and to declines in 
farm incomes in Europe, Japan and North America. Such a reform package is therefore unlikely to be 
implemented on its own. An alternative approach is to focus on broad-based reductions in market price 
support, as has begun occurring in the EU where domestic support has increasingly replaced border 
measures. As Dimaranan, Hertel and Keeney (2003) show, a shift from market price support to land-
based payments could generate a win-win-win outcome whereby OECD farm incomes are maintained 
and yet world price distortions are reduced and economic welfare rises for most developing countries 
and globally. Provided these increased domestic support payments are not linked to output or variable 
inputs, the trade-distorting and welfare-reducing effects are likely to be small, thereby providing an 
effective way of offsetting the potential losses that would otherwise be sustained by OECD farmers. 
This type of policy re-instrumentation increases the probability that such reforms is politically 
acceptable in the reforming economies while simultaneously increasing the likelihood that they will be 
beneficial to developing countries. That analysis suggests developing country governments should focus 
their efforts on improved access to OECD food markets while permitting wealthy countries to increase 
their decoupled domestic payments as import tariffs are lowered. 
 
 
4.  What is needed to make Doha a success 
 
The good news in this paper is that there is a great deal to be gained from liberalizing 
merchandise – and especially agricultural – trade under Doha, with a disproportionately high share of 
that potential gain available for developing countries (relative to their share of the global economy). 
Moreover, it is the poorest people in developing countries that appear to be most likely to gain from 
global trade liberalization, namely farmers and unskilled laborers in developing countries.
8 To realize 
that potential gain, it is in agriculture that by far the greatest cuts in bound tariffs and subsidies are 
required. However, the political sensitivity of farm support programs, coupled with the complexities of 
the measures introduced in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture and of the modalities set out 
in the Doha Framework Agreement of July 2004, ensure the devil will be in the details of the final Doha 
agreement. It is for that reason that ex ante empirical analysis of the sort referred to above is a 
prerequisite for countries engaged in the Doha round of negotiations. 
                                                 





What emerges from that analysis is that developing countries would not have to reform very 
much under Doha, because of the large gaps between their tariff bindings and applied rates. That is even 
truer if they exercise their right (as laid out in the July Framework Agreement) to undertake lesser tariff 
cuts than developed countries. In that case, they gain little in terms of improved efficiency of national 
resource use. Yet, as Panagariya (2004) and others have warned, for a non-trivial number of low-income 
countries their terms of trade could deteriorate. For some that is because they would lose tariff 
preferences on their exports. For others it is because they are net food importers and so would face 
higher prices for their imports of temperate foods. To realize more of their potential gains from trade, 
developing and least developed countries would need to forego some of the Special and Differential 
Treatment they have previously demanded, and perhaps also commit to additional unilateral trade (and 
complementary domestic) reforms, and to invest more in trade facilitation. High-income countries could 
encourage them to do so by being willing to open up their own markets more to developing country 
exports and by providing more targeted aid – and in the process be rewarded for it: Table 4 shows high-
income countries have nearly as much to gain from developing country reform as from within their own 
country group.   
In conclusion, the July Framework Agreement does not guarantee major gains from the Doha 
Development Agenda. On the one hand, even if an agreement is ultimately reached, it may be very 
modest. How modest depends on, among other things, the nature of the agricultural tariff-cutting 
formula, the size of the cuts, the extent to which exceptions for Sensitive and Special Products are 
allowed, whether a tariff cap is introduced, and the extent to which Special and Differential Treatment is 
invoked by developing countries. But what is equally clear, on the other hand, is that major gains are 
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Figure 2: Agricultural producer support in high-income countries, by country, 1986 
to 2003 
 




1 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovac Republic data are for 1991-93 in the 
first period. 
2 Austria, Finland and Sweden are included in the OECD average for both periods but 
also in the EU average for the latter period. 
 





Table 1: Average applied import tariffs, by sector and region, 2001 
 













a  WORLD 
    
  Agriculture and food 
 
High-income countries
b  18 18 18
Developing countries
a  14 18 16
  Textiles and wearing apparel 
   
 
High-income countries
b  81 51 2
Developing countries
a  72 0 9
  Other manufactures 







  All merchandise 
 
High-income countries
b  31 0 5
Developing countries
a  31 0 5
 
 
a These import-weighted averages incorporate tariff preferences provided to developing 
countries, unlike earlier versions of the GTAP database. 
 
b High-income countries include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories 
of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition economies 
that joined the EU in April 2004. 
 





Table 2: Agricultural weighted average import tariffs, by region, 2001 
(percent, ad valorem equivalent, weights based on imports) 
 
  





      
Developed countries  27  22  14 
Developing countries  48  27  21 
    of which: LDCs  78 14  13 
WORLD 37  24  17 
 
a Includes preferences and in-quota TRQ rates where relevant, as well as the ad valorem 
equivalent of specific tariffs. Developed countries include Europe’s transition economies 
that joined the EU in April 2004. The ‘developing countries’ definition used here is that 
adopted by the WTO and so includes East Asia’s four newly industrialized tiger 
economies, which is why the 21 percent shown in column 3 is above the 18 and 14 
percent shown in the first column of Table 1. 
 






Table 3: Impacts on real income from full liberalization of global merchandise 
trade, by country/region, 2015 
(Impacts in 2015 relative to the baseline, in 2001 dollars)        













as % of baseline 
income in 2015   
Australia and New Zealand  7.6  4.5  1.3 
EU 25 plus EFTA  60.4  -1.5  0.6 
United States  12.3  11.8  0.1 
Canada 3.3  0.2  0.4 
Japan 52.2  6.4  1.0 
Korea and Taiwan  44.2  0.1  3.5 
Hong Kong and Singapore  11.0  7.7  2.5 
Argentina 5.8  1.7  1.5 
Bangladesh 0.1  -1.1  0.1 
Brazil 10.9  5.3  1.7 
China 3.3  -9.2  0.1 
India 4.1  -9.2  0.5 
Indonesia 2.2  0.2  0.8 
Thailand 8.1  0.8  4.0 
Vietnam 3.0  -0.2  5.3 
Russia 3.0  -2.6  0.6 
Mexico 2.8  -3.7  0.3 
South Africa  1.5  0.1  1.0 
Turkey 3.4  0.2  1.4 
Rest of South Asia  1.1  -0.8  0.6 
Rest of East Asia  4.9  -1.2  1.7 
Rest of LAC  11.4  0.3  1.4 
Rest of ECA  1.4  -1.4  0.5 
Middle East and North Africa  12.9  -7.0  1.1 
Selected SSA countries  1.1  0.6  1.7 
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  2.5  -2.2  1.2 
Rest of the World  3.5  0.1  1.6 
High-income countries  190.9  29.1  0.6 
Developing countries--WTO definition  142.1  -21.6  1.2 
      Low- and middle-income countries  87.0  -29.4  0.9 
      Middle-income countries  69.4  -16.7  0.8 
      Low-income countries  17.6  -12.7  0.9 
      East Asia and Pacific  21.5  -9.6  0.6 
      South Asia  5.3  -11.1  0.5 
      Europe and Central Asia  7.8  -3.8  0.8 
      Middle East and North Africa  12.9  -7.0  1.1 
      Sub-Saharan Africa  5.1  -1.6  1.2 
      Latin America and the Caribbean  31.0  3.6  1.1 
World total  277.9  -0.3  0.7 
 







Table 4: Effects on economic welfare of full trade liberalization from different 




(a) Distribution of effects on global welfare 
 
 


























20 8  4 32 
ALL COUNTRIES’ 
POLICIES 
62 14  24  100 
 
 
(b) Distribution of effects on developing countries’ welfare 
 
 


























28 9  6 43 
ALL COUNTRIES’ 
POLICIES 
62 25  13  100 
 
a Developed countries include Europe’s transition economies that joined the EU in April 
2004. The ‘developing countries’ definition used here is that adopted by the WTO 
and so includes East Asia’s four newly industrialized tiger economies. 
 






Table 5: Impacts of full global merchandise trade liberalization on real factor prices, 2015
a 
(Percent change relative to the baseline in 2015) 
 










       
Australia and New Zealand  3.5  1.1  -0.6  20.9  1.5 
EU 25 plus EFTA  -0.1  1.3  0.4  -71.0  -1.2 
United  States  0.0  0.2 -0.1  -24.0 -0.3 
Canada  0.5 0.8 0.1  -5.2  -1.1 
Japan  1.5 2.4 1.2  -67.2  -0.2 
Korea and Taiwan  7.3  7.8  4.5  -45.8  -1.3 
Hong Kong and Singapore  3.3  1.6  0.3  10.1  1.1 
Argentina 3.3  0.4  -1.0  25.2  1.1 
Bangladesh  1.7 1.6  -0.5 2.1  -6.9 
Brazil  2.8 1.4 1.5  35.9 2.8 
China  2.0 1.8 2.4  -0.2  -0.1 
India  2.2 3.8 0.9  -2.9  -5.0 
Indonesia  3.4 1.2 0.5 1.4 0.9 
Thailand 13.4  6.3  3.7  12.5  -0.2 
Vietnam 23.3  15.1  8.8  5.8  -0.2 
Russia  2.0 2.7 3.2  -1.5  -3.0 
Mexico  1.9 1.4 0.1  -3.6  -1.1 
South  Africa  2.8 2.2 1.4  10.7  -1.2 
Turkey  1.6 3.0 0.8  -6.5  -0.1 
Rest of South Asia  3.4  2.7  -0.5  0.3  -2.1 
Rest of East Asia  5.4  3.6  4.4  -0.3  -1.0 
Rest of Latin America & Car  5.9  1.2  -0.8  19.9  -0.7 
Rest of E. Europe & C. Asia  2.8  3.6  1.9  1.1  -2.3 
Middle East & North Africa  3.8  3.2  1.8  7.1  -2.4 
Other  Southern  Africa  6.4 1.2  -0.3 5.3 1.1 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  8.4  5.7  1.5  6.4  -4.3 
Rest of the World  4.6  2.6  1.0  7.1  -1.2 
 






Table 6: Welfare effects of possible Doha reform scenarios, 2015 
 
(percent difference from baseline, and Equivalent Variation in income in 2001 $billion) 




























  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5  Scenario 6
   
High-income
e countries  0.20 0.17 0.05 0.13 0.25  0.27
   
Middle-income countries  0.09 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.15  0.15
   
Low-incomes countries  0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.18  0.24
   
TOTAL WORLD  0.17 0.15 0.04 0.10 0.22 0.24
   
 (and in $billion)  73.4 65.1 16.7 43.0 94.9  103.9
a Elimination of agricultural export subsidies and cuts in actual domestic support as of 2001 of 28 percent in the US, 18 percent in the 
EU, and 16 percent in Norway. 
b In Scenarios 1 and 2 the applied global average tariff on agricultural products is cut by one-third, with larger cuts in developed 
countries, smaller in developing countries, and zero in least developed countries. In Scenario 1 there are three tiers for 
developed countries and four for developing countries, following Harbinson (WTO 2003) but 10 percentage points higher.  
c Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) is expanded by a 50 percent tariff cut for developed countries, 33 percent for developing 
countries, and zero in least developed countries. 
d Developing and least developed countries cut all agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs as much as developed countries. 
e High-income countries (HICs) include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition economies that joined the EU in April 2004. 






Table 7: Dollar change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 
(change in real income in 2015 in 2001 $billion compared to baseline scenario) 
  Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 4 Scen. 5 Scen. 6 
Australia & New Zealand  2.3      2.5  1.5  1.4  2.7  2.9 
EU 25 plus EFTA  30.1      28.7  11.2  11.3  31.9  35.3 
United States  1.7      2.2  1.3  0.9  3.7  4.8 
Canada  1.9      1.7  0.9  0.9  1.5  1.4 
Japan  18.3      14.5  0.8  12.4  23.2  24.6 
Korea and Taiwan  10.8      7.2  1.6  15.8  15.0  15.7 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -0.1      -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  1.5  2.1 
Argentina  1.4     1.5 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.6 
Bangladesh  -0.1      -0.1 0.0 0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Brazil  3.4     3.3 1.2 1.2 3.7 3.8 
China  -0.7     -0.6 -1.7 -1.3  1.5 -0.2 
India  0.3     0.2 0.3 0.2 2.3 3.2 
Indonesia  0.1     0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.1 
Thailand  0.9     1.0 0.8 0.8 2.1 2.5 
Vietnam  -0.1     -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.5 
Russia  -0.3     -0.1 -0.7 -0.7  0.9  1.2 
Mexico  -0.4     -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -1.1 -0.5 
South Africa  0.1     0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 
Turkey  0.6     0.5 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 
Rest of South Asia  0.2      0.2  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3 
Rest of East Asia  -0.1      0.0  -0.1  0.9  0.1  -0.1 
Rest of Latin America & the Carib.  3.7      3.6  0.6  0.4  3.9  3.9 
Rest of E. Europe and Central Asia  -0.1      -0.1  -0.2  -0.2  -0.6  -0.8 
Middle East and North Africa  -1.2      -1.3  -1.6  -1.6  -1.0  -0.4 
Other Southern Africa  0.1      0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  0.0      0.0  -0.4  -0.4  -0.1  -0.1 
Rest of the World  0.4      0.3  0.0  0.0  0.6  0.6 
High-income  countries  65.0     56.6 17.1 42.6 79.4 86.7 
Developing countries  8.3      8.5  -0.4  0.5  15.5  17.2 
     Middle-income countries  7.3      7.6  -0.6  0.4  11.9  12.5 
     Low-income countries  1.0      0.9  0.2  0.0  3.6  4.7 
     East Asia and Pacific  0.1      0.5  -0.7  0.3  4.1  2.9 
     South Asia  0.5      0.4  0.4  0.5  2.5  3.5 
     Eastern Europe and Central Asia  0.2      0.3  -0.9  -0.9  0.9  1.2 
     Middle East and North Africa  -1.2     -1.3 -1.6 -1.6 -1.0 -0.4 
     Sub-Saharan Africa  0.2      0.2  -0.2  -0.1  0.4  0.7 
     Latin America & the Caribbean  8.1      8.1  2.6  2.3  8.0  8.8 
World  total  73.4     65.1 16.7 43.0 94.9  103.9 
 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.10) 
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Table 8: Percentage change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios, 2015 
(change in real income in 2015 in percent compared to baseline scenario) 
  Scen. 1 Scen. 2 Scen. 3 Scen. 4 Scen. 5 Scen. 6 
Australia & New Zealand  0.40      0.43  0.26  0.24  0.47  0.50 
EU 25 plus EFTA  0.30      0.29  0.11  0.11  0.32  0.35 
United States  0.01      0.02  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.03 
Canada  0.21      0.19  0.10  0.10  0.16  0.16 
Japan  0.37      0.29  0.02  0.25  0.47  0.49 
Korea and Taiwan  0.85      0.57  0.13  1.25  1.18  1.24 
Hong Kong and Singapore  -0.03      -0.03  -0.05  -0.04  0.34  0.48 
Argentina  0.36     0.37 0.31 0.29 0.37 0.40 
Bangladesh  -0.07     -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.10 -0.08 
Brazil  0.52     0.50 0.19 0.18 0.56 0.58 
China  -0.03     -0.02 -0.06 -0.05  0.06 -0.01 
India  0.03     0.03 0.04 0.03 0.26 0.36 
Indonesia  0.05     0.08 0.09 0.01 0.36 0.41 
Thailand  0.45     0.51 0.39 0.40 1.02 1.26 
Vietnam  -0.19     -0.21 -0.09 -0.14 -0.83 -0.86 
Russia  -0.06     -0.03 -0.15 -0.15  0.18  0.24 
Mexico  -0.04     -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.12 -0.06 
South Africa  0.08     0.10 0.14 0.21 0.25 0.44 
Turkey  0.25     0.21 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.31 
Rest of South Asia  0.13      0.11  0.06  0.14  0.17  0.19 
Rest of East Asia  -0.04      -0.01  -0.02  0.30  0.04  -0.02 
Rest of Latin America & the Carib.  0.44      0.43  0.07  0.05  0.46  0.47 
Rest of E. Europe and Central Asia  -0.05      -0.05  -0.07  -0.07  -0.21  -0.27 
Middle East and North Africa  -0.10      -0.11  -0.13  -0.13  -0.08  -0.04 
Other Southern Africa  0.21      0.19  -0.03  -0.05  0.19  0.21 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.01      -0.02  -0.17  -0.17  -0.05  -0.03 
Rest of the World  0.20      0.15  0.00  0.02  0.26  0.27 
High-income  countries  0.20     0.17 0.05 0.13 0.25 0.27 
Developing  countries  0.08     0.08 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.17 
     Middle-income countries  0.09      0.09  -0.01  0.01  0.15  0.15 
     Low-income countries  0.05      0.04  0.01  0.00  0.18  0.24 
     East Asia and Pacific  0.00      0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.12  0.09 
     South Asia  0.04      0.03  0.03  0.04  0.22  0.30 
     Eastern Europe and Central Asia  0.02      0.03  -0.09  -0.08  0.09  0.12 
     Middle East and North Africa  -0.10      -0.11  -0.13  -0.13  -0.08  -0.04 
     Sub-Saharan Africa  0.05      0.05  -0.04  -0.02  0.09  0.17 
     Latin America & the Caribbean  0.29      0.29  0.09  0.08  0.29  0.32 
World  total  0.17     0.15 0.04 0.10 0.22 0.24 
 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.10) 
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Table 9: Effects on bilateral merchandise trade flows of adding non-agricultural 
tariff cuts to agricultural reform under Doha, 2015 
 




                                                                         
  Propn’l agric reform only
a     Agric plus non-agric reform
b 












   
Exports from :   
High-income
c countries  16 5 76 48 
    (% increase) 
 
0.7 0.3 3.4 2.6 
Developing countries  14 2 65 14 
    (% increase) 
 
0.6 0.2 2.9 1.6 
TOTAL WORLD  29 7 141 62 
    
 
 
a Scenario 2 in Table 6 
 
b Scenario 5 in Table 6 
 
e High-income countries include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories 
of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition 
economies that joined the EU in April 2004. 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Table 12.14) 
 Table 10: Effects of a comprehensive Doha reform on agricultural output and employment 
growth, by region, 2005 to 2015 
 
(annual average growth rate, percent) 
 
                         Output                             Employment
 
  Baseline  Scenario 5
b  Baseline  Scenario 5
b 
       
Australia and New Zealand  3.5  4.4  0.4  1.1 
Canada 3.5  4.3  0.2  1.0 
United States  2.2  1.7  -0.8  -1.4 
EU 25 plus EFTA  1.0  -0.4  -1.8  -2.8 
Japan 0.5  -1.4  -2.7  -4.1 
Korea and Taiwan  2.2  1.6  -1.3  -2.1 
        
Argentina 2.9  3.6  0.9  1.6 
Bangladesh 4.2  4.2  1.1  1.2 
Brazil 3.3  4.4  1.1  2.2 
China 4.3  4.3  0.8  0.8 
India 4.3  4.4  1.0  1.0 
Indonesia 3.0  3.0  -0.7  -0.6 
Thailand -0.1  0.4  -4.6  -4.3 
Vietnam 5.8  5.9  3.9  4.0 
Russia 1.5  1.4  -2.3  -2.3 
Mexico 3.9  4.1  2.0  2.4 
South Africa  2.5  2.7  0.0  0.1 
Turkey 3.0  3.1  -0.5  -0.5 
Rest of South Asia  4.8  4.9  2.0  2.1 
Rest of East Asia  3.7  3.8  0.2  0.3 
Rest of Latin America & Ca  4.4  5.3  1.9  2.7 
Rest of E. Europe & C. Asia  3.3  3.4  0.0  0.1 
Middle East & North Africa  4.0  4.1  1.5  1.6 
Other Southern Africa  5.3  5.4  3.0  3.0 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  4.6  4.8  2.2  2.3 
Rest of the World  5.0  5.5  2.4  2.8 





Kanderson@worldbank.orgArguments for removing trade 
barriers
To allow each nation’s resources to be used to 
exploit its comparative advantage by producing what 
it does best
That in turn can increase (esp. in small economies):
scope for exploiting economies of scale,
competitiveness of domestic markets,
the variety of available goods and services,
technological catch-up and hence economic growth
Empirical evidence: there are many examples of 
reformed economies that have boomed
and none of booming closed economies
Not to say openness is sufficient for sustained 
economic growth, but it is a necessary conditionSo why do governments still 
retain protectionist policies?
Because some workers, and owners of some 
productive resources, fear that they will lose 
from reform, and that social safety nets will 
not fully compensate them
Any losses in jobs, incomes and wealth would 
be concentrated in the hands of a few, while 
gains will be small per capita for the many 
benefitting firms or consumers, so the latter 
have less incentive to counter the former’s 
lobbying
Î A political equilibrium can involve protectionDeveloping countries’ arguments 
for retaining protection
Support for infant industries
Food price instability
Food security/self sufficiency in the 
case of food-deficit countries
Terms of trade deterioration
In the case of those receiving tariff 
preferences, concern that multilateral 
reform will erode those preferences What can alter the political 
equilibrium level of protection?
Wider dissemination of information on the 
gains from trade
Technological innovations that lower trade 
costs (e.g. ICT revolution), or increased 
openness abroad, which increase the 
incentive for exporters to lobby for reduced 
protection at home
such globalization forces raise the rewards from 
good economic governance and raise the cost of 
poor economic governance
Îmore countries are looking to open up, and that 
is easier if done when others do likewiseWhy trade negotiations make 
reform easier
They offer scope for exchange of 
market access
And more so the larger the number of 
countries taking part and the broader the 
product and issue coverage
Î WTO negotiations offer the most scope, 
but bilateral and regional negotiations may 
allow faster and deeper integration – but at 
the risk of trade and investment diversionWhy bother to reduce sensitive agric 
subsidies and trade barriers …
… when agriculture contributes <4% of 
global GDP and 9% of international trade?
Because while manufacturing import tariffs 
are now low, agric protection has risen and 
its applied import tariffs now average nearly 
five times manuf tariffs globally;
And because the vast majority of the world’s 
poor, who rely on farming for a living, are 
keen to trade their way out of povertyWhy reform agric policies (cont.)
True, the harm to some poor farmers from 
OECD agric protection is reduced via non-
reciprocal trade preference schemes
But those discriminatory market access 
schemes, like agric export subsidies, rely on 
undesirable exceptions to worthy WTO rules
And they exclude some significant developing 
countries (China, India, Indonesia, Vietnam) 
and so may harm more poor farmers, 
through trade diversion, than they helpWhat is at stake?
What are the potential welfare gains from full 
global trade reform, by country/region, due 
to:
developed rel. to developing countries’ policies?
agriculture relative to manufacturing policies?
within agriculture, tariffs relative to export 
subsidies and domestic support? 
And how close could Doha get us to 
completely free merchandise trade?Welfare cost of current protection 
policies by 2015
Global cost of current tariffs and agric 
subsidies would be $278 billion p.a. by 2015, 
according to the World Bank’s Linkage Model
which is 0.7% of global income
• Would be much higher if the model had a stronger trade-
growth linkage and included imperfect competition, economies 
of scale and an opening up of services (esp. labour) markets
2/3rds accrues to developed countries
But, as a % of GDP, the cost to developing 
countries is twice that to developed countriesContributions to welfare from removing all 
trade barriers and subsidies, post-UR, 2015 
(per cent of global total) 
 









   High Income 35 0 2 38
  Developing 95 2 1 6
  Total 45 6 3 54
Developing 
 High Income 551 9 2 9
  Developing 93 2 1 6
  Total 15 9 21 45
All Countries 
 High Income 43   6 21 69
  Developing 20 8 4 31
  Total 62 14 24 100
 Contributions to global welfare from removing 
key agricultural policy instruments in high-
income countries, 2015 
 
(per cent of total gain from agric reform in HICs) 
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 Effects of full lib’n on developing country 
agriculture by 2015 (relative to baseline in 2015)
agric and food’s output in 2015 would be 3% 
greater
decline in agric employment would be slowed
Agric net incomes are higher
Ag land prices and unskilled wages are higher
Ag & food gross exports are 77% higher 
Ag & food net exports $87 billion higher
Î pro-poor outcomesKey elements of the Doha Agenda
We focus on agric market access in particular
because it is by far the biggest potential 
contributor to global and developing-country 
welfare gains
So we assume no services reform, but we 
model the following:
phase out agricultural export subsidies
reduce agricultural domestic support
and cut agric and non-agric bound tariffs under 
various alternative market access packagesAgricultural market access
Tiered formula for cutting bound tariffs (with 
Special and Differential Treatment for 
developing countries, or SDT)
& allow a few ‘sensitive’ products to be exempt
We compare it with a proportional cut of 
same average size for high-income and 
developing countries
And we look at effects of imposing a tariff cap 
of 200%Agricultural domestic support
We cut the bound Aggregate Measure of 
Support (AMS), but this need not reduce 
actual levels of domestic support because of 
“binding overhang” (the difference between 
commitments and current support)
We apply a tiered reduction to the bound 
AMS: 75% if AMS>20%, otherwise 60%
Leads to only 4 countries reducing support:
US 28%, Norway 18%, EU 16%, Australia 10%Other bits of the Doha package
50% cut in bound tariffs on non-agricultural 
goods for high-income countries and 33% for 
developing countries (except zero for LDCs)
We also examine the effects of developing 
countries becoming full participants in Doha 
(i.e., foregoing Special and Differential 
Treatment)
recalling from earlier GATT Rounds that 
developing countries only got what they gave, in 
terms of increased market accessServices and trade facilitation
These areas offer great potential gains, 
especially for developing countries
But few significant signs of commitment 
have been forthcoming yet
Hence we assume zero changes for 
these items in our modeled Doha 
scenariosResults from Doha agric reform
Tiered formula cut in tariffs with SDT gives the 
world $72 billion
but only $7 billion go to developing countries
and if rich countries exempt just 2% as sensitive 
products, global gain shrinks to $16 billion 
and developing countries lose
• although a 200% tariff cap reduces much of that shrinkage
If tiered formula is replaced by proportional one 
to yield same average tariff cuts, global gain is 
nearly as high ($64 billion)
Î Worth bothering to negotiate a complex tiered formula? 
Or use a Swiss formula instead? Adding non-agric market access …
… boosts global gain from $72 to $95 billion
which gets the world 1/3rd of the way to the 
potential gains from complete free trade in 
merchandise 
If developing countries were to forego SDT in 
market access, global gain would rise from 
$95 to $119 billion per year
And developing countries’ gain would rise by 
50%, to $23 billion per yearImplications for developing countries
Most of their gains go to large 
agricultural exporters, while Sub-
Saharan Africa gains little
To gain more, poor countries have to 
liberalize more 
which they would be better off doing under 
Doha, so as to get reciprocity (greater 
market access abroad) and/or more aid, 
than unilaterally?DC welfare gains with SDT
(percent change from baseline income in 2015)
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ThailandConclusions and policy implications
Potential gains from further trade reform are huge
Even after UR and recent accessions to WTO and EU
ÎMust find the political will for Doha success
DCs would gain disproportionately from reform
Notwithstanding non-reciprocal tariff preferences
But as much would come from South-South as South-
North trade growth, hence the importance of 
developing countries’ own liberalization
After outlawing export subsidies, agric tariff cuts 
are the highest priority from a welfare viewpoint 
and if Doha is to be pro-development/pro-poorConclusions and implications (cont)
Cuts in agric tariffs and domestic support bindings 
need to be large to get beyond “binding overhang”
Even large cuts in agric tariffs do little if 
‘sensitive’ and ‘special’ products are exempt
Unless a tariff cap of, say, 100% is enforced
DCs would have to make few cuts because of their 
huge “binding overhang”
So they can afford to tone down their demands for SDT 
(and ‘special’ products) and trade it for greater access 
to rich-country markets (& fewer ‘sensitive’ product 
exemptions by rich countries)Lessons and implications (cont)
Removal of cotton subsidies in US and EU 
would raise the developing countries’ share 
of global cotton exports from 56% to 85%
Some least-developed countries could lose 
slightly unless they reform more to get 
greater efficiency gains to offset their terms 
of trade losses, or are compensated with aid